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In the 1970s, Chile underwent profound struc-  analytical model to study the impact of those
tural changes in market regulation, public sector  policies on wages, unemployment, and invest-
policies, and foreign trade.  ment.  He concludes:
These changes produced notable economic  Segmentation of the Chilean labor market,
strain and high open unemployment.  After the  combined with an inadequate institutional
financial crisis of the 1980s - by means of an  framework for the labor market and a distorted
export-led structural adjustment program that  real exchange rate, havc been at the root of the
supported high real exchange rates and pro-  persistent cpcn unemployment problem.
moted investment - the Chilean economy
adjusted successfully and resumed economic  Because of cxisting labor market s^rgmenta-
growth.  tion, macro policics have probably increased tlC
wage gap betwecn the formal and infornal  labor
Riveros describes the important role labor  markets.
markets played in the adiustment process.
A more adequate regulatory framework tor
Expenditure-switching and expcnditure-  the labor market was probably instrumental in
reduction policies are important in intcrpreting  achieving a more equitable and effective adjust-
the observed performance of labor market vari-  ment program.
ables.  Riveros econometrically estimates an
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Like  other  LDCs,  at  the  outset  of the  1980s  Chile  faced  persistent
internal  imbalances  and  an  unsustainable  external  deficit. This  was partly
due  to internal  factors,  especially  the  econouic  policy  of the late  1970s
ih.ich  sustained  a real  revaluation,  stimulated  low  savings,  and  allowed  for
growing  indebtedness.  However,  the  lending  cutback  of 1982  and  both a sharp
drop  in terms  of trade  and increase  ;.n  international  interest  rates  were also
crucial  factors. The  economy  was  unable  to  quickly  generate  a trade  surplus
in response  to those  ezternal  developments.  After  a deep recession,  and  due
to  export  promotion  and  other  policies  dealing  with the  debt  problem,  the
Chilean  economy  hat resumed  sustained  growth.
The labor  market  attained  a key role  in  the  adjustment  undergone  by the
Chilean  economy. As predicted  by the standard  adjustment  theory,  a decline  in
real  wages  occurred  as a result  of expenditure-reducing  and  expenditure-
switching  policies. However,  due  to rigidities  that  hindered  labor  mobility,
the  economy  suffered  persistent  high unemployment.  Those  rigidities  were
mainly  associated  with the  presence  of labor  market  segmentation.  As a result
of the  post-1984  export-led  adjustment  program  and  a more deregulated  labor
market,  open  unemployment  declined,  employment  in  tradables  increased  notably
and real  wages  started  a  recovery.
Without  the  profound  structural  economic  reforms  of the  1970s  rapid
achievement  of growth  and  macroeconomic  equilibrium  after  the financial  crash
of 1982-84  would  have  been  nearly  impossible. In fact,  those  reforms  allowed
for  flexible  and  competitive  markets,  as required  to achieve  macroeconomic
adjustment. Similarly,  the  precarious  situation  of labor  market  variables  in
the  late  1970s  is essential  in  understanding  the  effect  of the 1980s'  crisis.2
In this  paper  we review  stylized  facts  of the  Chilean  labor  market
during  the  period  of structural  reforms  of the  19709  and  that  of crisis  and
recovery  in the  1980s. To analyze  the  effect  of macro  policies  -- and given
that  existing  wage  differentials  as  well as the  behavior  of both  unemployment
and  investment  are  central  in interpreting  the  role  of the  labor  market  in the
adjustment--we  adopt  a segmented  labor  market  model  in  which  we study  the
effect  of exchange  rate  policies  on those  variables. We analyze  the  wage
determination  process  in  the formal  and the  informal  sector  through  a
statistical  model  that  allows  us to look  at the  effect  of typical  macro
policies. A main implication  is  that,  were labor  markets  less  segmented,
unemployment  during  the  adjustment  would  have  been lower. Given  that
segmentation  is linked  to labor  market  policies,  less  intervention  would  have
been advisable.
The  structure  of the  paper  is as follows. In section  two  we discuss  the
economic  scenario  of the  1970s  and  1980s,  giving  special  attention  to the
economic  reforms  and  adjustment  policies  that  affected  labor  markets  more
importantly. In section  three  we analyze  observed  labor  market  outcomes  in
the  1970s  and 1980s. In section  four  we attempt  to interpret  the  observed
labor  market  trends  on the  basis  of a segmented  labor  markets  model  in  which
government  intervention  plays  a  crucial  role. On the  basis  of that  model,  the
role  of exchange  rate  policies  on the  formal/informal  wage gap is  examined.
In section  five  we include  a summary  and  conclusions.3
2.  TUE ICOM4OSC  SCENARIO
2.1  Uervlew
Achievement  of deep  economic  reforms  in the  1970s  radically  changed
relative  prices  and reduced  State  intervention  in  the economy. A deregulation
phase  aimed  at correcting  major  existing  distortions  took  place in  1973-75.
In a second  phase (1975-76),  heavier  emphasis  was put  on price  stabilization
while  also  continuing  with the  structural  reforms. Appreciating  real  exchange
rates,  high domestic  interest  rates  and  lebor  market  friction  created
macroeconomic  strain  during  1976-80  and  primoted  ligher  growth  of non-tradable
production. During  this  third  phase,  the  economy  was characterized  by growing
real  wages,  high growth  and  high  unemployment.  The 1982-84  financial  crisis
conveyed  a sharp  economic  decline  amid serious  balance-of-payment  problems.
Afterwards,  due  to sharp  devaluations  combined  with expenditure  reduction  and
other  policies  aimed  at affecting  expectations,  increasing  savings  and
promoting  exports,  the  economy  experienced  a nota'!le  export-led  economic
expansion. This sequence  of phases  is paramourt  in explaining  observed  labor
market  outcomes.
2.2  The  Economic  Reforms  of the  1970.
The  post 1973  military  government  embarked  upon an intense  program  of
economic  reforms  aimed  at improving  efficiency  in  the framework  of an open
economy. Many observers  have analyzed  the  specific  targets  and  policy  tools
used in achieving  those  reforms. 1 However,  the  direct  and indirect  impact  of
the reform  program  on the labor  market  has received  relatively  less  attention.
1  To this respect,  see  Edwards  & Edwards  (1987),  Walton  (1985)  and  Corbo
(1983).4
Major  changes  in lebor  market  institutions  were deemed  necessary  in the
context  of a  freer,  more de-regulated  open  economy. The  presence  of some
intervening  policies  notwithets!ding,  those  changes  directly  affected  wages
and  emp 1oyment. Deregulation  of  output  markets,  the  opening  of the  economy
and the  reduction  in the  economic  size  of the  state,  indirectly  affected
employment  and  wages  as  a higher  labor  mobility  was  demanded  by  vital shifts
in the  skill  composition  of the  labor  demand. A more detailed  description  of
the  main reforms  will subsequently  facilitate  the  analysis  of both  effects.
2.2.1.  Trade  Reforms
Chile,  like  many other  LDCs,  pursued  industrialization  based  on a
sizable  import  substituting  industry. High trade  barriers,  considerable
inefficiency,  discrimination  against  agriculture  and  growing  government
intervention  in economic  management  -were  major  outcomes  of that  policy  (Corbo,
1987). Paradoxically  enough,  employment  growth  in manufacturing  was
negatively  affected  (Corbo  & Meller,  1984),  and  labor  market  segmentation
occurred  due  to increasing  labor  protection. Since  e  failure  in  achieving
an efficient  industrial  sector  required  progressively  higher  protective
barriers,  average  tariff  rates  reached  as  high as 105  pzrcent  by 1973 (Torres,
1982)  2
2. Ad-valorem  tariff  rates  ranged  from  0  to  7510,  while  import  prohibitions
applied  to 187 tariff  classification,  a 90 day import  deposit  requirement  was
in  effect  for  2,800  others  and  2,300  categories  required  special  approval  from
the  Central  Bank.5
The  post-1973  r.0orms  aimed  at sharply  reversing  import-substitution
through  a far reaching  opening  up.3 The trade  opening  was expected  to  produce
more investment  and  employment  in sectors  with comparative  advantages. The
observed  failure  in  obtaining  higher  exports  and  growth  of labor-intensive
Jndustries  in  the 19709  is traced  to two  drawbacks:  1) the  taiiff  reduction
program  did  not start  off  with a  very  precise  finni  target,  thus  creating
uncertainty  in investors  (Rivsroe,1986);  2) the  exchange  rate  was used  as a
stabilization  device,  thus  allowing  for  substantial  overvaluation 4 (Corbo,
1985;  Edwards  & Edwards,  1987). However,  amid  high internal  interest  rates
and  growing  peso  appreciation,  the  economic  authority  decided  to open the
capital  account;  besides  the  macro  imbalances  so generated  (Edwards  & Edwards,
1987),  this  policy  allowed  large  firms  to adopt  more capital-intensive
techniques.  thus  also  affecting  employment  in expanding  activities.
3.  Tariff  reduction  was planned  to reach  an  average  60Z  by 1977.  By 1975
average  tariffs  had  reached  57Z,  while  almost  all  quantitative  restrictions  were
eliminated  . In  a  second  stage,  a  new  structure  was  defined,  with  tariffs  ranging
from  10 to 35Z,  a  target  achieved  during  the third  quarter  of 1977.  Finally,  a
more radical  reform  allowed  the  average  nominal  tariff  rate  to  reach  an uniform
102  by late  1977.
4  After unification  of the exchange  rate in 1973, an initial  3001
devaluation  and a  series  of mini-devaluations,  the real  ex hange rate reached
a  peak  value  by late  1975.  Subsequently,  the  real  exchange  rate  declined  sharply
concluding  in  a  102  appreciation  in  june  1976.  Real  peso  appreciation  continued
being used as a stabilization  device  through  a system  of devaluations  that
allowed for certain real appreciation.  However, inflation  did not drop as
expected.  From June 1979 a  nominally  fixed  exchange  rate  was implemented  and
maintained  until  mid-1982,  when  dramatic  peso  devaluations  took  place  in  the  wake
of the  world recession.  In this analysis,  appreciation  is represented  by a
decline  in  the real  exchange  rate.6
2.2.2  Public  Sector  Reforms
Another  set  of reforms  after  1973  aimed  at reducing  the  economic  size  of
the  State  through  both reduction  of government  expenditures  ana  privatization
of public  firms. The  huge fiscal  deficit  which  existed  in 1973  is an
indicator  of the  economic  importance  the  State  had reached  in  Chile. 5 Another
indicator  is the share  of parastatals  in total  production,  which  had been  14
percent of  GDP in  1965  and reached  39  percent  of  GDP in 1973 (Hachette  &
Luders,  1987).
Still  another  indicator  is the  importance  of the  State  as employer,  especially
during  the  socialist  experiment  of 1970-73,  when  public  sector  employment
reached  about  15 percent  of total  employment. 6
Under  the  idea  of subsidiary  State,  a profound  prival.ization  program  was
implemented,  concurrently  with policies  aimed  at achieving  more efficient
central  government's  services. Private  firms  intervened  during  the  socialist
government  were immediately  privatized  after  1973:  by the  end of 19t4, 202  out
of 259  had  been returned  to their  owners  (Larrain,  1988). Additionally,  a
sale  of assets  owned  by the  State  was quickly  implemented,  most of Banks'
shares  (USS  171  million)  and a significant  part  of industrial  property  (US$  58
million)  being  sold  by 197i. 7 Since  parastatals'  share  in  GDP dropped  from  39
S  In fact,  as a proportion  of  t:-  GDP, the  fiscal  deficit  reached  10.7,
13.0,  24.7 and 10.5 respectively  in j.i71,  72, 73 and 74.  As seen in Table  1,
the  decline  experienced  in 1975-76  was dramatic.
6  In  1970  about  a  1OZ  of  the  labor  force  was  employed  in  the  public  sector
(central  government  and  parastatals),  while  in  1973  this  proportion  reached  more
than  13 percent.  As  seen in Table  3, this  proportion  declined  to a 7Z by 1980
and to abouat  5? in 1988.
. This  was  a  year  of unprecedented  economic  decline  (GDP  fell  by 12.9Z),
thus originating  unprofitable  sales.  At the same time, firms  were sold below
their  book  values  although  above  their  stock  market  value [Larrain,  1987].7
percent  in  1973  to a still high 24 percent in 1981, further privatization took
place  at the  tim  of the  crisis  of the  1980s. Owing  to active  job  creation  in
the  public  sector  in 1971-73,  and  existence  of redundant  employment,  major  job
cuts in  both the  civil  service  and  parastatals  took  place  between  1973-75
(Table  3).
Table  1
Chilet  Macroeconomic  Indicators
Output  Output  Gross Fiscal  C.Acc.  Change  Real
CDP  Growth  Growth CP!  Hm  Im.  Def.  Def.  in  Zxch.
Growth  (T)  (UT)  Infl. wrowth  -(Percent  of GDP)-- Reser.  Rate
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)
1970  2.1  1.4  2.9  32.5  60.2  16.4  2.7  -1.0  1.3  38.5
1975  -12.9  -16.6  -8.4  379.2  257.2  13.1  2.6  -6.8  -3.1  100.0
1976  3.5  5.3  1.6  234.5  189.4  12.8  2.3  1.5  2.4  91.5
1977  9.9  7.8  9.4  113.8  113.5  14.4  1.8  -4.1  1.2  83.5
1978  8.2  4.5  9.6  49.8  65.0  17.8  0.8  -7.1  5.1  101.6
1979  8.3  7.0  10.0  36.6  57.8  17.8  -1.7  -5.7  6.1  105.9
1980  7.8  5.5  10.0  35.1  64.0  21.0  -3.1  -7.1  6.4  94.0
1981  5.5  3.8  5.4  19.7  -3.8  22.7  -1.7  -14.5  -0.9  74.8
1982  -14.1  -11.2  -10.8  9.9  7.3  11.3  2.3  -9.5  -4.9  81.1
1983  -0.7  0.5  -6.1  27.3  27.7  9.8  3.8  -5.6  -2.8  98.1
1984  6.3  7.9  5.3  19.9  12.1  15.3  4.0  -10.7  0.2  100.8
1985  2.4  2.5  2.4  30.7  11.3  13.9  6.3  -8.3  -1.2  123.0
1986  5.7  6.7  5.0  19.5  41.4  15.0  2.8  -6.5  -0.5  139.9
1987  5.4  3.5  6.6  19.9  9.8  na  0.1  -4.6  0.5  143.5
Notes:  T -Tradable;  NT-Non-Tradable;  Inv-Investment;  C.Acc.-Current
Account;  Reser  - net Reserves;  Def-Deficit.
Tradables  includes  agriculture,  fishing,  mining  and  manufacturing.
Non-tradables  includes  construction  and  services.
The  Real  effective  exchange  rate (10)  is the  real  multilateral  exchange
rate  in terms  of the  wholesale  prices  of trading  partners  and  Chile's  cpi.
Average  Investment/GDP  during  1960-69  was 14.9Z  of GDP.
Ml growth  (5)  is the  December  to  December  Growth  of  Ml.
Sources:  (1), (2).  (3),  (5),  (6),  and (7),  Indicadores  Economicos  y Sociales,
1960-85,  Banco  Central  de Chile,  1987.
(4),  (6), (8)  and (9),  Corbo (1988);  (10),  Cottani  (1987).8
2.  .3  Markets  Dererulation.
A top  priority  of the  post-1973  reform  program  was the improvement  of
resource  allccation  through  an efficient  price  system. Hence,  and  countering
a  historical  tradition  of price  fixing,  price  regulation  was almost  completely
eliminated  at once.8 Likewise,  interest  rates  were also deregulated  and
quantitative  constraints  for  capital  market  operations  were eliminated  before
1979.  Increased  market  competition  faced  entrepreneurs  with the  need to
improve  productive  efficiency.
The  wave of deregulation  also  reached  the  labor  market,  thus  yielding
important  effects  after  a  period  of acute  government  intervention  and  heavy
union  activism. tnions  were de facto  eliminated,  their  leaders  being  hand-
picked  by the  government  itself. Job security,  which  was a  traditional  rule
in  Chile,  was also  eliminated,  while  wage bargaining  was suspended. Minimum
wages  and  non-wage  cost  regulations  were  upheld  and  a  wage indexation  system
was im?lemented,  but  with little  effect  (Edwards  & Edwards  (1987),  Riveros
(1986]. As discussed  below,  a  major  failure  of the  Drogram  was the lack  of a
labor  law  during  1973-79  --  and  even  of signals  about  projected  legal  changes
--  thus creating  expectatiors  on high  future  firing  and  hiring  costs.
2.2.4  The Stabilization  Program
The initial  phase  of the  structural  reforms  was accompanied  by a sharp
stabilization  effort  in  1975-76. A dramatic  drop in fiscal  def""-i  from  10.5
8.  After  an era in  which  more than 3,000  prices  were set  and eventually
controlled  by the authority,  only 33 commodities  remained  under  control,  most
of them  utilities.9
to 2.6  parcent  of CDP  was achieved  in one  year, 9 accompanied  by a tighter
monetary  policy  and, later  on,  by exchange  rate  appreciat'.on.  The
unemployment  effect  of the  across-the-board  reduction  in aggregate  demand  was
Laportant,  as well as the  drop in real  wages.  The stabilization  effort  also
affected  long  run  growth  because  of its  effects  on investment  and  wealth
(Edwards,  1985).
2.3  The  1982  Fiancial  Crisis  and  the  Policy  Response.
Some  indicators  reveal  the  magnitude  of the  crisis  the  Chilean  economy
f%ced  in 1982.  The  total  external  debt increased  from  2.7 times  the  total
exports  in 1979,  to 4.6  times  in  1983.  As a share  of GDP, the  external  debt
increased  from  40  percent  to 100  percent  in the  same  years,  while  yearly
interest  payments  increased  from  3 to 10 percent  of GDP.  At the same  time,
and  due  to an early  policy  reaction  to the  crisis,  the  value  of imports  in
real  terms  declined  by  more than  40  percent  (Table  2),  which  precipitated  a
GDP  drop  of mere than  15 percent  in  GDP (Table  1).  This  GDP drop  was
accompanied  by an even  larger  decline  in  aggregate  investment,  thus  also
affecting  future  growth. The  magnitude  of the  external  shock  is seen  in the
drop in terms  of trade (from  119 in 1979  to  88 in 1983),  and  the increase  in
real (LIBOR)  interest  rates  from  2.6  to 4.6  percbnt. 10
In 1984  a so called  wadjustment-  without-recession'  approach,  resulted
in huge reserve  losses  and  further  external  indebtedness.  The  current  account
9.  The fiscal  deficit  (measured  against  GDP) declined  from  24.7 to 10.5
between  1973 and  1974.  A further  drop to 2.6  was achieved  in 1975.  All this
occurred  basically  through  reduction  in  public  sector  expenditures.
10  See,  Corbo  &  Sturzenegger  (1988).  Between  1978  and  1984  the  real  LIBOR
increased  from 1.1  to 6.1  percent.10
deficit  almost  doubled  betwtan  1983  and  1984,  while  the fiscal  deficit
increased  by more than  40  percent.  Although  unsustainable  in  the  medium  run,
this  approach  resulted  in  a GDP growth  of  more than  6  percent  in 1984,  but
also in declining  exports  and  a large  growth  in  external  payments  (table  2).
After  1985,  the  adjustment  program  pursued  the  maintenance  of a  high real
exchange  rate,  further  privatization  of public  firms  and  control  of fiscal
expenditures,  creation  of  mechanisms  allowing  to convert  external  debt  into
investment, 1"  specific  incentives  for  exports,  and  targeting  fiscal  social
expenditures  to the  poor.  As a result,  the  economy  has resumed  strong  growth
(more  than  5.5  percent  p.a. in 1986-88  and  about  10 percent  during  1989),  with
a large  expansion  of  non-traditional  exports,  investment  growth,  low inflation
and sharply  declining  open  unemployment.
3.  LABOR  MARKET  EFFECTS OF THE  ADJUSTHENT  PROGRAM
The  economic  reforms  of the  1970s  exerted  major  effects  on the  labor
market. One  of the  most important  was the increase  in  open  unemployment  rates
from  an average  of about  6 percent  of the labor  force  during  the 1960s  to one
of more than  16 percent  during  1974-81  (Table  3).12 Moreover,  even  with  high
GDP  growth  in 1976  and  1981,  open  unemployment  remained  at relatively  high
levels  (Table  3).  A  related  result  was  the  decline  in  average  real  wages,
which  started  a recovery  in 1976  in the  presence  of higher  unemployment  but
not  reaching  their  previous  1970  level  (Table  4).  In addition,  during  1976-
11* Which  has  yielded  a  drop  of the  total  external  debt in  more than  102.
12, This  average  includes  persons  in  Emergency  Employment  Programs  (EEP).
As  discussed below,  this  calculation yields an  economically meaningful
unemployment  level.  If EEP  are  not included,  the  average  unemployment  in 1974-
81 reaches  about  132  of the  labor  force.11
Table  2
Chile:  External  Sector
1979  1980  1981  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
1. External  Debt
(a)  Total  8.49  11.8  15.5  17.1  17.4  18.9  19.3  19.4  19.1
(b)  Interest  0.67  0.93  1.46 1.92  1.75  2.02  1.90  1.89  1.70
(c)  Debt/Exports  2.7  2.4  4.1  4.6  4.6  5.2  5.1  4.6  3.7
(d)  Debt/GNP  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.8  1.0  1.1  1.4  1.3  1.2
2.  Exports(FO3)
(a)  Traditionals  2.16  2.62  2.18  2.12  2.34  1.96  2.12  2.10  2.60
(b)  Non-Traditional  1.68  2.09  1.66  1.58  1.50  1.69  1.68  2.10  2.62
(c)  Total  3.84  4.71  3.84  3.71  3.83  3.65  3.80  4.20  5.22
(d)  Total(1980)  4.33  4.71  4.41  4.87  4.78  4.92  5.32  5.92  n.a.
3.  Importa(CIF)
(a)  Consumer  Goods  1.33  2.07  2.73  1.48  1.02  1.04  7.51  7.54  9.01
(b)  Capital  Goods  0.95  1.27  1.45  0.70  0.39  0.60  0.65  0.74  1.10
(c)  Total  Imports  4.71  6.15  7.32  4.09  3.17  3.74  3.27  3.44  4.40
(d)  Total  Imp.(1980)5.81  6.19  6.25  4.25  3.36  4.04  3.59  3.65  n.a.
4.  Terms  of Trade (1980-1OOJ
118.5  100  84.3  80.4  87.5  83.2  78.5  82.0  77.0
Note:  1987  is preliminary  . Figures  are  expressed  in  billions  of current  US
dollars. (1980)  indicates  that  the  series  is expressed  in constant
1980  billions  of dollars.
Traditional  exports  include  copper  and  mining.
Non-traditional  exports  are  agricultural  and industrial  products.
Sources:  (1),(2)  and (3):  Boletin  Mensual,  Banco  Central  de  Chile.
2(d)  and 3(d):  World  Tables  (IBRD);  (4):  Corbo  & Sturzenegger  (1988).
81 employment  in  non tradable  activities  expanded  more rapidly  than  in
tradables,  a result  not  concordant  with the  outward  orientation  of the
economic  program,  but  explainable  in the  context  of the  signals  provided  by an
appreciating  real  exchange  rate (Table  1).  Finally,  traditional  labor  market
institutions  -- like  wage bargaining,  unionization  and  job security  laws--
were  not legally  specified  by until  1979,  thus  likely  affecting  expectations
and  countering  employment  creation  in  expanding  tradable  activities.T.ble  3
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3.1  ftVloyin  t-qe.loyment  Trends  in the  1970C
Explanation*  on the  persistent  high  unemployment  seen  in the  1970s
occupied  a  prominent  place  in the  literature  (see,  for  a review,  Riveros
(1985),  Meller  (1985)]. After  a  protracted  debate,  there  is consensus  in that
alternative  explanations  have to be combined  to  provide  a consistent  theory  on
the  unemployment  figures  shown  in Table  313 (Edwards  & Edwards,  1987].
A first  explanation  refers  to a higher  labor  force  growth  seen  in tYhe
1970s  relative  to the  1960s. In fact,  although  participation  rates  did  not
increase  and,  on the  contrary,  slightly  declined  in 1974-80,  labor  supply
growth  was triggered  by the  post-WW-II  'baby  boom' (Castaneda,  1983). Some
estimates  showed  that  this  supply  effect  may account  for  no  more than  3 points
of the  higher  open  unemployment  seen  in the  1970s  (Riveros,  1986).
A  second  explanation  refers  to the  effect  of policies  regarding  public
sector  and  trade  reforms. Figures  on public  sector  employment  (Table  3) show
a dramatic  decline  after  1973,  thus  likely  raising  total  unemployment  in the
short  run.  Between  1973  and  1978  public  sector  employment  fell  by almost  3
percent  of the labor  force, 14 while  public  sector's  wage bill  declined  by
about  3  percent  of GDP in  1973-76  (Larrain,  1988). Moreover,  elimination  of
job security  amid  increased  competition  in product  markets  gave  rise  to a
13,  Statistics  presented  in Table  3 adds to total  observed  unemployment
those  included  in  EEP  but  declaring  themselves  as 'employed'  to  the  surveys  (see
Riveros,  1986).  The  economic  interest  of  this  corrected  series  is  that  it  allows
to observe  actual  supply  pressures  on th:  labor  market.
14, According  to  Paredes  (1987),  with data  taken  from  Marshall  &  Romaguera
(1979),  public employment  in 1973 reached about 388,000 persons.  Cortes &
Sjaastad (1982) suggested  a  more drastic decline between 1973-76: public
employment  declining  by  more than  62 of the labor  force.14
drastic  reduction  in redundant  employment  in the  private  sector. 15 Hence,  the
array  of reforms  of the  1970s  would  have transformed  the  hidden  unemployment
likely  existing  in the  economy  before  1973 into  open  unemployment.  A
third  explanation  refers  to existence  of labor  market  imperfections.  In fact,
the  two  explanations  described  above  assume  that  wages  did  not  play  any
significant  role in accommodating  a larger  labor  supply  or a decline  in labor
demand. Although  this is a likely  short  term  outcome,  a prolonged  period  of
high  unemployment  may  be ascribed  to the  presence  of  market  imperfections.
The  basic  hypothesis  here is that  the  existence  of  protected/unprotected
sectors  in the  labor  market  --  and  possibly  the  expansion  of the informal
sector  during  the  19709  --  led  to increased  quasi-voluntary  unemployment,
associated  with a  queueing  of informal  sector  workers  for  formal  jobs.  The
observed  evolution  of  wage differentials  seems  to  provide  support  to this
hypothesis  (Riveros,  1986;  Cox-Edwards,  1986). In addition,  statistical
analyses  reveal  that  the  role  of certain  labor  market  policies  was an
important  source  of queueing  unemployment  (Riveros  & Paredes,  1989).
A fourth  explanation  refers  to skill  mismatches  derived  from  the  major
productive  shifts  associated  to the  structural  reforms,  which  would  have
produced  aignificant  shortages/surpluses  of industry-specific  skills. This is
suggested  by  the  presence  of a growing  tradable/non-tradable  wage gap for  both
skilled  and  unskilled  labor  and  by increasing  returns  to the  general  human
capital  in  economic  sectors  undergoing  expansion  (Riveros,  1986). Prolonged
friction  was associated  to  wrong  signals  emanating  from  both the  lack  of labor
laws  and  an appreciating  real  exchange  rate,  that  did  not allow  expansion  of
15'  Most entrepreneurs  declared  to a survey  carried  out through  a World
Bank study  that one of the  most beneficial  reforms  in connection  with firms'
adjustment  was that referring  to labor  laws.1S
more labor  intensive  sectors  like  agriculture  and  export  manufacturing,  which
are  less  intensive  in specific  skills  then  typical  import  substituting
activities. The  result  was a stubborn  persistence  of  wage differentials  and
lack  of labor  mobility  toward  expanding  industries.
While  employment  in tradables  did  not  expand  significantly  in 1976-81
(Table  3),  employment  in  non-trad-bles  was  much  more dynamic,  growing  at an
average  of 5.8  perceat  p.a.. 1 6 This  higher  growth  was  mainly  associated  with
construction  activities,  private  services  and  the  financial  sector. As seen
in Table  1, non-tradable  production  also  expanded  relatively  more during  the
19709  (at  7.7  percent  p.a. in 1976-81,  while  tradables  grew  at only 5.7
percent  p.a.),  thus  revealing  a major  problem  with the  signals  provided  by
exchange  rate  policies  and, lately,  by the  opening  of the  capital  account.
3.2  The Performnce  of Real  wages
The  official  (National  Bureau  of Statistics  - INE)  wage index  shows  a
dramatic  decline  in real  formal  sector  wages  during  the  recessionary  years  of
1975-76,  which followed  the  drop  of 1973  due  to a spiraling  inflation  (Table
4, col (2)). Figures  obtained  from  University  of  Chile's  surveys 17 (Table  4,
col(6))  indicate  a  very similar  trend,  although  a less  dramatic  decline,  which
is probably  due to  more stable  labor  earnings  in  informal  activities. The
earnings  index  based  on skill  categories  (Table  4 cols (4)  and (5)),  indicates
16  Employment  in tradables  grew  at an average  of only 1.3  percent  p.a.
and  employment  in agriculture  at 0.8  percent  p.a.
17  These  surveys  cover  the  Greater  Santiago  area  and  collect  information
on labor  incomes  once  a  year,  covering  both  the  formal  and  the  informal  sector.
Yanez (1987)  constructed  sectoral  wages  based  upon this information. The  INE
series  is  based  in firm-based  surveys,  thus  being  more representative  of formal
sector  activities.16
Table  4
Chilet Real  Wages
(Indext  1980-100)
---------- INE ---------  ---  University of Chile ---  Total
Kini  u  Average  p  anuf.  Unskilled  Skilled  Average  Ianuf.  Labor
Wage  Wage  Wage  Wage  Wage  Cost
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)
1970  73.5  109.7  97.1  124.1  144.0  110.0  103.9  0.69
1975  91.9  62.5  58.3  77.3  66.7  62.8  72.0  0.43
1976  92,9  78.9  78.6  77.0  77.7  71.5  80.4  0.60
1977  83.0  79.9  78.6  80.3  89.5  81.3  84.9  0.88
1978  100.0  85.0  87.4  82.4  97.6  91.0  101.7  1.06
1979  97.1  92.0  94.2  102.6  103.3  99.6  108.1  1.28
1980  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  1.45
1981  113.2  108.8  115.5  120.4  117.7  114.4  131.5  2.42
1982  123,5  108.6  110.7  126.6  133.3  133.2  146.7  2.08
1983  93.4  97.0  102.9  80.9  95.2  95.1  111.5  1.30
1984  82.3  97.1  99.0  77.8  89.8  89.4  101.3  1.13
1985  74.3  93.0  97.1  75.6  74.4  75.5  85.1  0.77
1986  78.8  95.0  101.9  64.4  66.6  72.6  78.7  0.78
1987  66.9  93.1  103.2  63.1  65.2  71.4  77.1  0.81
Note: (8)  is  expressed  nominal  dollars  per  hour.
Sources:  (1):  National  Bureau  of Statistics  (INE);two  legal  minimums  existed
in 1970:  for  white  and  blue  collar  workers. The latter  is  used here.
(2)-(3):  INE;  Average  for  each  year.
(4)-(5):  Paredes  (1987)  ;May  of each  year.  Unskilled  wages are  a proxy
for  informal  sector  wages  and  correspond  to an average  for  sel-employed
workers  with less  than  8 years  of schooling. Skilled  wages  are  a  proxy
for formal  sector  wages  and  correspond  to an average  for  blue and  white
collar  workers  with more than  8 years  of schooling.
(6)-(7):  Yanez ((1988);  May  of each  year.
All the  wage data  have  been  deflated  by the  average  corrected  CPI  based
in INE,  Yanez  (1979)  and  Cortazar-Marshall  (1979).
(8):  Riveros  (1988).
a relatively  more pronounced  wage decline  for  the  skilled  labor,  while
unskilled  wages  recovered  in 1982  levels  similar  to 1970,  a trend  similar  to
that  actually  shown  by the  aggregate  INE  index. A major  question  with regard
to those  wage changes  is their  distributional  impact  across  skill  groups,17
which in turn  may reflect  a different  effect  of  macro  pjlicies  across  labor
market  segents.
The real  minimum  wage (HW)  was  relatively  stable  in  1976-80,  but
declined  sharply  during  the  post-crisis  period. It is  noteworthy  that  MWs
grew significantly  relative  to both  the  equilibrium  wage for  unskilled  labor
in the  informal  sector  and  the  average  wage in  the  economy. Hence,  MWs  were
probably  important  in  affecting  both average  wages (Paldam  &  Riveros,  1987),
and the  level  of employment  of less  skilled  workers (Riveros  & Paredes,  1988,
1989)  18
Average  real  wages  were growing  in the  presence  of unemployment  rates
higher  than the  historical  averages. Nonetheless,  during  the  growing  phase
(1976-81),  unemployment  was declining,  which  would suggest  an adequate,  though
probably  slow,  allocative  work of the  labor  market. However,  in interpreting
observed  wage growth  in 1976-81,  a binding  role  of the indexation  mechanism
implemented  by the  military  government  was suggested  (Cortazar,1983).  This is
a  very  unlikely  explanation  at least  for  the  period  1973-79,  when a labor  law
was lacking,  unions  were banned,  wage  bargaining  was suspended,  job security
norms  were  nonexistent  and  unemployment  was relatively  high.  Possibly,  a
"neoclassical,  model  would  be  more suitable  to  explain  observed  wage trends  in
this  period. On the  contrary,  in  1979-82,  wken the  new labor  law  was enacted
and  included  a wage indexation  rule,  the  explanation  of a binding  indexation
postulated  by Cortazar  is  more acceptable. The  wage indexation  scheme
prevailing  in 1973-79  was deficient  not  only  because  of  meager  enforcement,
but  also  because  the  past  CPI inflation  was normally  higher  than  mandated
18,  The argument  here is that  MW increases,  increased  open  unemployment
and caused the withdrawal from the labor force of  lowly-skilled  people,
particularly  women  and  young  job  seekers.is
adjustments  (Edwards  & Edwards,  1987)  and the  actual  --corrected  --  inflation
was  even  higher  than  the  official  one (Cortazar,1983).  Moreover,  the  mandated
adjustments  were not  more than  an ladvice'  for  the  private  sector  to follow
public  sector  wage increases.
Analysis  of  wage indexation  in 1976-81  is important  in  connection  with
its  effect  on other  macroeconomic  variables  --  particularly  inflation  and  the
competitiveness  of the  domestic  production  --  and  with regard  to  evaluating
the actual  role  played  by labor  market  forces  in that  period. We used
quarterly  INS  data  on  wages --  which  were also  the  ones  used  by Cortazar  for
the  entire  period  1974-81  --  to estimate  a regression  equation  in  which
mandated  wage increases  (H)  'explain'  the  actual  change  in average  wages (W).
Regression  results  reveal  that  in 1973-79  the  presumed  causality  from
mandated  wage increases  to  average  wage growth  is debatable. As shown  below
(Table  5),  the  correlation  between  these  variaLles  is  high,  and the  parameter
associated  to  M reaches  a value  1.0. However,  when the  quarterly  inflation
rate (P)  is included,  the  effect  of M on W does  not  have any interpretation:
it  has L negative  sign. When the  past rate  of inflation  (P-1)  is included,
the  parameter  associated  to  M is still  significant,  but its  effect  on average
wages is relatively  smaller  than  that  of inflation. 1 9 In other  words,  the
observed  effect  of mandated  adjustments  of an average  wage seems  to reflect  no
more than  the  effect  of price  inflation  on wages.
The  performance  of  wages in  the  Chilean  economy  during  ;973-79  can  be
better  explained  by an economic  model  taking  into  account  the  existence  of
19*  When we included  lagged  adjustments  (M-1)  and the actual  inflation,
both  parameters  were  significant  and  the  values  were  0.70  and  0.26,  respectively.
Alternative  lag  structures  were used  with regard  to both  M and  P.19
Table  5
Chile  Wase Indexation  Results  1973.3-1979.2
Constant  H  p  P-1  R2  DW
(X)*  4.57  1.0  0.72  1.74
(1.12)  (7.0)  (51.2)
(2)*  6.05  -0.60  1.37  0.97  1.98
(4.20)  (-3.65) (10.5)  (93.5)
(3)*  0.21  0.40  0.65  0.88  2.13
(0.78)  (3.0)  (5.75)  (71.7)
The  method  of estimation  was  OLSQ.  *  indicates  that  correction  for first  order
serial  correlation  was implemented.
The  value  of the t test  is  presented  under  the  corresponding  parameter.
The  value  of the  F  test is  presented  under  the  R2.
unemployment. A  standard  short  run  wage setting  equation  was adopted  to test
this  hypothesis,  in  vhich  nominal  wage growth  is explained  by price  inflation,
unemployment  (U)  and  the  growth  in  avera6a  labor  productivity  (q). In
estimating  a regression  model,  we assume  that  only the  cyclical  portion  of
total  unemployment  (UC)  is actually  able to  affect  market  wages (Lopez  &
Riveros,  1988).20  We found  a significant  effect  of both  unemployment  and
inflation  on observed  wage changes  in the  period  1974.2-1979.2  (Table  6, row
1).  In addition,  when the  variable  H (mandated  wage ine:reases)  was included
in the  equation.  it  produced  a  non-significant  coefficient. This  would
suggest  that  wage setting  in this  period  was driven  by economic  rather  than
institutional  forces.
20  The  estimate  of cyclical  unemployment  was obtained  from  a regression
discussed  in section  4, in  which total  unemployment  is set  as function  of both
structural  and  cyclical  variables.  This  is  version  of  the  model  proposed  by  Lopez
& Riveros (1988)  and applied  by Riveros  & Paredes  (1989b).20
Table  6
Chiles  The  Unemployment  -Wages  Trade-off.
Period  Constant  P  uc  q  R2 DW
1974:2-79:2
(1)*  24.1  0.98  -21.1  -0.02  0.97  1.5
(3.98)  (24.6)  (-3.4)  (-0.32)  (220.3)
1979:3-82:2
(2)  9.1  0.23  -4.7  0.04  0.10  1.9
(0.68)  (0.48)  (-0.4)  (0.14)  (2.92)
(3)*  1.2  0.971/  -1.4  0.37  0.42  1.8
(0.15)  (3.37)  (-C0.2) (1.61)  (4.41)
The  equations  were estimated  with OLSQ.  *  indicates  that  a correction
for  first-order  serial  correlation  was  performed. The t  values  are  presented
under  the  corresponding  coefficients. The  F value  is  presented  under  the  R2.
1/s  the  parameter  correspotAd  to the  variables  P-1.
Quite  another  story  fits  the  period  1979.3-1982.2,  when  wage indexation
was included  in the  new labor  law  enacted  in  1979,  which also  gave rise  to
unionization  and  to formal  wage  negotiation. As seen in  Table  6 (row  3), the
effect  of logged  inflation  is significant,  but  the  overall  fit  is  much poorer,
while the  parameters  of unemployment  is statistically  equal  to zero.  This
suggest  that  most likely  the  nominal  wage behavior  was  dictated  by
institutional  indexation  rules
An important  implication  of this  wage analysis  refers  to the  importance
of institutional  labor  market  intervention  polices. Wage indexation  created
substantial  rigidities  to accommodate  production  and  employment  to a changing
external  environment,  because  it  was  binding  at a time that  the  exchange  rate
was nominally  freezed. Thus,  indexation  caused  a notable  increase  in  wages in21
terms  of the  price  of tradables  (Corbo,  1983).21 In addition,  indexation
further  segmented  the labor  market  in a  period  of output  and  employment
growth. If  wrong  signals  had  deteriorated  employment  growth  in the  years
previous  to 1979,  in 1979-82  overvaluation  and the  blow  on tradables
production,  were  a further  reason  for  persistent  unemployment.
3.3  Distributive  Results.
Income  distribution  deteriorated  sharply  as a result  of the  reform
program  of the  1970s. The  social  cost  of the  adjustment  was associated  with
the  creation  of higher  unemployment  and  to declining  real  wages (Riveros,
1985). The  Gini coefficients  for  the  family  income  distribution  (Table  7)
notably  increased  in 1974-76  to decline  cnly  slightly  afterwards  (between  1976
and 1979).22 Strikingly,  during  the  expansionary  years  1979-81  --  amid  a
financial  boom --  the  observed  income  distribution  further  deteriorated  (Table
7),  this  being  consistent  with the  observed  unemployment  persistence  and  low
wage levels  still  existing  during  that  period. The  decline  seen  in the  Gini
coefficients  after  1984 is  most likely  related  to the  better  performance  of
employment  and  wages  with the  export-led  growth  strategy.
Existence  of fiscal  social  expenditures  in  the form  of direct  monetary
subsidies  to the  poor,  makes  disputable  estimates  of Gini  coefficients  based
on only labor  incomes  because  they  would  be downward  biased. However,  in
21.  Data on dollar labor costs in Table 4  (Col.8),  indicates  the
substantial  increase  associated  to the  period  in discussion.
22  In  Table  7  we include  two  alternative  Gini  coefficients  for  the  family
income  distribution.  To calculate  the  one in col (1),  we ranked  households  by
the total income  of the household.  To calculate  the second  one (col (2))  we
ranked  households  by the per  capita  income  of the  household  (Riveros  & Weber,
1988).  However,  similar  conclusions  are  reached  in  analyzing  both  coefficients.22
1976-79  the  need to control  inflatiov  and  to tighten  fiscal  expenditures
caused  a severe  decline  in social  outlays. After  1980,  the  observed  increase
(Col  (4)  Table  7) is  associated  with the  privatization  of the social  security
system,  the  emergency  employment  programs  and  to significant  reforms  in  health
and  education  which  also  permitted  a better  targeting  of social  outlays  to the
poor.  Declining  social  outlays  after  1985  are  associated  with fiscal
restraint  and  to improvement  in some  labor  market  results. Thus,  existence  of
lower  fiscal  social  expenditures  in  combination  vith a  better  targeting  of
poor  groups,  do  not provide  a clear  clue  on  the  actual  distributive  trends
during  the  adjustment.
3.4  Labor  Market  Aftermaths  in the  1980s
Unemployment  skyrocketed  during  the  financial  crisis,  when the  corrected
rate  reached  as  high as 30 percent  of the labor  force  (Table  3).  This result
was basically  demand-driven  since  participation  rates  did  not substantially
change  with the recession. In addition,  employment  in tradable  sectors
dropped  relative  to total  employment,  an outcome  likely  associated  to the
increase  in  urban informal  jobs.  Furthermore,  real  wages declined
substantially  as unemployment  was increasing,  the index  reaching  a level  of 93
after  the level  of 109  seen  in 1981-82  (Table  4),  which still  was below  the
1970  level.
As  a result  of the  policy  stance  of 1984,  total  corrected  unemployment
fell  importantly  as employment  grew  by about  10 percent  and  emergency
employment  declined. Nevertheless,  as the  1984  program  was short-lived,  reel
wages  declined  by  more than  4  percent  in 1985,  at the  time  that the  real
exchange  rate  further  depreciated  (Column  (9),  Table  1).  The  unemployment23
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Chiles  Social  Indicators
Fiscal  Per  Capita
Gini  Coefficient  Income  Share  of  Social  GDP
(1)  (2)  402  Poorest  Expenditure  (1976  US$)
tZ  of GDP)
1960  0.4590  na.  13.59  na.  na.
1965  0.4750  na.  12.87  na.  na.
1968  0.4980  na.  11.70  na.  1.114
1970  0.5010  0.4345  11.50  na.  1.137
ls  4  0.4499  0.4232  na.  11.08  1.090
1975  0.4710  0.4127  12.78  10.30  0.933
1976  0.3380  0.4886  na.  9.99  0.950
1977  0.5260  0.4762  na.  10.S6  1.026
1978  0.5197  0.4662  na.  10.16  1.091
1979  0.5179  na.  na.  9.25  1.162
1980  0.5257  na.  10.88  10.29  1.231
1981  0.5220  na.  11.24  12.80  1.277
1982  0.5390  na.  9.95  15.76  1.078
1983  0.5420  na.  10.07  15.10  1.052
1984  C.5550  0.5151  9.33  15.40  1.100
1985  0.5320  0.5011  10.13  15.12  1.108
1986  0.5390  0.499'  10.00  14.30  na.
1907  0.5310  0.4950.  10.22  13.97  na.
Notes:  (1)  Estimates  based  on total  family  income.
(2)  Estimates  based  on per  capita  family  income.
Sources:  (1), (2)and  (3):  Riveros  & Weber (1987);  (4):  Torche  (1985)  and
unpublished  data;  (5):  World  Tables,  The  World  Bank
rate  experienced  a steady  decline  since  1984.  in  a  way apparently  correlated
with the recovery  in GDP  which  was accompanied  by expanding  employment  and
production  in tradable  industries,  and  by a  notable  increase  in  non-
traditional  exports  since  1985 (Table  2).  In fact,  employment  in agriculture
and  manufacturing-mining  grew  at 6  and 11  percent  per  year respectively  in
1985-88,  when total  employment  grew at  6  percent  per  year.  Even though  the
econe'y  underwent  a  major  adjustment  program  during  1985-87,  output  and
employment  grew  importantly  in  agriculture  and  manufacturing  as a result  of24
strong  exports. At the  same  time,  a  more deregulated  labor  market,  in  which
the  institutional  framework  was  clearly  defined,  and  the  maintenance  of high
real  exchange  rates  allowed  expansion  of labor-intensive  sectors.
4.  A MDDIL  FOR  ADJUSTEKT POLICIES  AND LABOR  MARKUT  RESPONSE
This section  discusses  and  presents  estimates  of a  model  aimed  at
analyzing  observed  wages  and  unemployment  in  presence  of labor  market
segmentation.  In this  model,  segmentation  is linked  to the  ezistence  of
protected  and  unprotected  sectors  with regard  to the  coverage  of several  labor
market  regulations. In considering  that  protected  sectors  usually  consist  of
large  urban  finAs  and the  public  sector,  the  protected/unprotected  breakdown
significantly  overlaps  with the  traditional  formal/informAl  dichotomy. Given
that  the  enforcement  (and  enforceability)  of certain  regulations  may  prompt
asymmetrical  wage effects  across  sectors,  this  approach  to segmentation  is
appealing  from  an analytical  viewpoint.
Existence  of a growing  protected/unprotected  wage gap in  a period  of
substantial  macro  adjustment  may explai;u  persistent  unemployment. In fact,
the  existence  of queueing  unemployment  --  in the  form  of informal  sector
workers  queueing  for  formal  sector  iobs  --  is likely  to increase  during  the
adjustment  if  the relative  degree  of labor  protection  in the  formal  sector
increases. For instance,  as suggested  by the  increase  in  minimum  wages
relative  to  wages  of unskilled-informal  labor  during  the  period  of reforms,
the relatively  larger  protection  awarded  to formal  sector  workers  may  have  not
only resulted  in  more unemployment  but  also in  unequitable  effects  in terms  of
wages  in the  unprotected  sector.25
In a  neoclassical  labor  market,  one  would  expect  flexible  wages in face
of aggregate  expenditure-reducing  and  expenditure-switching  policies,  This
condition  would imply  declining  vages  in terms  of the  price  of tradables  that,
in turn  will produce  labor  shifts  from  the  production  of  non-tradable  to
tradables. Rigid  wages in  a neoclassical  labor  market  will result  in lack  of
mobility,  thus  leading  to standard  policies  aimed  at removing  wage
distortions,  but  will  not  necessarily  create  systematic  changes  in  wage
differentials  across  certain  labor  force  groups.
In a segmented  labor  market  adjustment  policies  would  exert  an
unequitable  effect  in terms  of the  observed  protected/unprotected  wage gap.
In  particular,  nominal  wages in  the  protected  sector  will  be less  responsive
to a change  in tradable  prices,  thus  making  a nominal  devaluation  less
effective  in  achieving  a real  devaluation. This  will  hinder  the inter-
industrial  labor  mobility  and  increase  total  unemployment. In addition,  the
deterioration  in income  distribution  in terms  of  wage gaps  will affect  the
sustainability  of adjustment  programs. Thus,  persistent  unemployment,  a
deteriorating  income  situation  of the  poorest  segment  of the  labor  market,  a
decline  in production  of non-tradables  (due  to  a drop in  relative  prices),
lower  employment  in protected  activities  and  implementation  of repeated
ineffective  nominal  devaluations  are  probable  outcomes  in  a segmented  market.
4.1  A Theoretical  Model
The  urban  labor  market  is segmented  into  a protected  (formal)  sector
characterized  by government  and  union  intervention  in  wage setting  and  by
binding  minimum  wages,  and  an unprotected  (informal)  sector  which is  basically
a neoclassical  labor  market. The formal  sector  produces  both tradable  and26
non-tradable  goods  with skilled  and  unskilled  labor,  while  the informal  sector
produces  non-tradables  with only  unskilled  labor. 23
The (formal)  market  for  skilled  labor  determines  a  notional  equilibrium
wage (ws*);  the  actual  equilibrium  wage (we)  includes  a distortionary  factor  9
associated  to government  and  union  intervention.  Thus,  the  actual  nominal
equilibrium  wage is  written  as:
Ws  - $Vs*  (l]24
where  0>1.  The  minimum  wage  (MH)  is  binding  for  unskilled  labor  in the  formal
market  and  we  assume  some  degree  of substitution  of skilled  for  unskilled
labor. Thus,  the formal  sector  demand  for  skilled  labor  (Lds)  is  written
like:
Lds  - Lds(ws,  9,  MW,  PT,  PN,  K)  +  Lg  (2]
where PT and  PN are, respectively,  prices  of tradables  and  non-tradables,  K is
capital  stock  and  Lg is  public  sector  employment. This  function  is
homogeneous  degree  one  in prices  and  wages.
The labor  supply  of skilled  workers  (Lss)  is:
23* This  model  follows  the  basic  lines  presented  in  Lopez  &  Riveros  (1987).
Assumptions  on the  informal  sector  satisfy  two  important  characteristics  of  this
sector in LDCs  (PRZALC, 1985): it  is  a  low  productivity sector mainly
concentrated  in the  services  sector.
24  A  more general  specification  of this relationship  is explored  in
Lopez  & Riveros (1989c).27
Los - Lss(wv,  MV, CPI,  N)  [3]
where  CPI is the  consuDr price  index  (in  turn,  an average  of PT and  PN),  and
N is  working  age  population.
The formal  sector  demand  for  unskilled  labor  (Ldu)  is:
Lduf  - Lduf (MV,  vs, PT,  PN,  K)  [41
which depends  on  we because  of the  substitution  possibilities  between  skilled
and  unskilled  labor.
The total  supply  of unskilled  labor  (Lsu)  in the  economy  is
Lsu  - Lsu(MW,  wu,  CPI, N, K)  (5]
where  wu is the  equilibrium  wage in the  informal  sector. Finally,  the
informal  sector  labor  demand  is:
Ldu - Ldu(wu,  PK,  MW, K)  (6]
Given  MW and  Lsu,  employment  of unskilled  labor  in the  formal  sector  is
determined  through  (41,  thus  leaving  an effective  supply  to the  informal
sector  which,  in  combination  with  Ldu, determines  wu.25
For et,:ical purposes,  the  equilibrium  form  of the system  will be
considered. Thus,  the system  is reduced  to two  equilibrium  wages  equations.
25  This type  of equilibrium  follows  the  concept  introduced  by Harberger
(1971).  Given  that  there  will be persons  with supply  price  above  wu, but  below
the (given)  MV, there  will exist  queueing  (quasi-voluntary)  unemployment.28
This  will allow  to concentrate  the  analysis  on the  effect  of policies  on the
formal-informl  wage gap, thus  cir:unventing  estimation  of the  underlying
structural  demnd  and  supply  functions  --  for  which employment  and labor  force
data  are  more scarce. Equilibrium  in both  the  skilled  (formal)  market  and the
unskilled  (informal)  market  yields  the  following  expressions:
vs a  wV(Mi  , PT,  PN,  K, Lg,  N)  (7]
vu *  wu(MW,  we, PT,  PN,  X, N)  (83
Due to the  homogeneity  properties  of the  underlying  demand  and supply
functions,  (7]  and (8]  are  homogeneous  degree  zero  in  prices  and  wages.
Bence,  for  estimating  purposes  both equations  will be  written  in terms  fo  MW.
Unemployment  in this  model  results  from  two  sources:  labor  market
distortions  (i.e.,  wages  above  notional  equilibrium  in the formal  skilled
market  and queueing  unemployment  in  the informal  market)  and  cyclical
fluctuations  in the  economic  activity. Hence,  a general  formulation  of an
unemplo"-ment  equation  may allow  to empirically  derive  both  components  based  on
aggregAte  data.  In equation  [9]  both structural  and cyclical  factors  are  used
to explain  aggregate  observed  unemployment.  Given  their  association  with
structural  unemployment  --  in  turn  due  to the  presence  of labor  market
distortions  --  the ratio  MW/Wu  and  the  value  of the  distortionary  factor  6  are
lncluded. The  growth  trend  of the  labor  force  (LFT) 26 is also included  as a
factor  associated  to the structural  unemployment  in the  economy. Among  the
26  This  variable  is obtained  by fitting  actual  labor  force  data to a
time  trend.29
cyclical  factors  we consider  unexpected  changes  in the  following  variables:
GDP (Y),  terms  of trade (TOTS)  and  the  labor  force  (LFS). Unexpected  changes
are empirically  proxied  through  the  difference  between  observed  values  and  the
fitted  values  obtained  from  a regression  of the  respective  variables  against  a
time  trend. Thus,  the  following  uncmploy  tnt  equation  was estimated:
U - U(MW/Wu,  9,  LFT,  Y, TOTS,  LPS)  (9]
Using (9],  we estimate  cyclical  unemployment  as the  difference  between  U
(total  unemployment)  and  US (structural  unemployment).  US is  calculated  as
the  sum  of the  shift  coefficient  and  the  parameters  associated  to  MW/Wu,  9,
and  LFT obtained  from  eq. [9],  multiplied  by the  values  of the  corresponding
variable.  Thus,  the  third  equation  in the  system  corresponids  to  cyclical
unemployment  (UC)  which is:
UC - UC(Y,  PN,  PT,  ws,  wu, Lg,  K, N)  (10]
Equation  [10]  results  from  specifying  equilibrium  wages in  both the skilled
and  unskilled  markets,  and allowing  for  the  presence  of unemployment. This
equation  is homogeneous  degree  zero  in income,  prices  and  wages.
Prices  of non-tradables  are  endogenously  determined. However,  to allow
a better  focus  on the labor  market  issue,  we do not include  an equation  for
PN,  but  we will account  for its  endogeneity  in  estimating  the  structural
system. 27 PT is  determined  using  the  small-country  assumption,  thus  being
27  Lopez &  Riveros (1989)  present a model in which prices of non-
tradables  are  oimultaneously  estimated.30
equal  to the  nominal  ezchange  rate  multiplied  by the  world  price  of tradables.
The  model  is closed  with an investment  equation  which  allows  to connect
the short  run  and  the  long run.Investment  responds  to  a partial  adjustment  to
a  desired  capital  stock  level,  while  the  optimal  capital  stock  depends  on the
interest  rate,  wages,  prices  and  growth  (Y). Hence,  the  tollowing  investment
function  is  estimated:
I - I(i,  Pt,  Pn,  wu,  w8,  MW, Y)  [11]
Given  the  price  and income  homogeneity  properties  of the  model.28  we
arbitrarily  chose  to normalize  by the  minimum  wage.  Equations  [7],  18], (10]
and (111  were estimated  in rate  of changes  through  3SLS.  The results  are
presented  in Table  9 below. 29
4.2  ftwirical  Results
As a preliminary  step,  and  to obtain  the  parameters  to subsequently
compute  the  cyclical  unemployment  rate,  we empirically  estimated  equation  (9].
The  2SLS  estimates  presented  below  indicate  that  the  distortionary  factor
MW/Wu is statistically  significant  to explain  observed  unemployment. This
result  suggests  that  queueing  unemployment  is an important  component  of the
structural  unemployment  and, in turn,  of total  open  unemployment. Labor  force
and  terms  of trade  are  also significant  explanatory  variables.
28* The  demand  and  supply  functions  are  homogeneous  degree  zero  in  prices,
wages  and income.  The  wage equations  are  homogeneous  degree  one in prices.  We
also  assume  the  investment  and  the  unemployment  functions  are  homogeneous  degree
zero  in prices  and income.
29* Appendix  1 indicate  definition  of the  empirical  variables  and sources
of information.31
Using  these  sconometric  results,  we decompose  total  unemployment  into
its  structural  and  cyclical  components. Results  are  presented  in Figure  1.
An interesting  feature  is that  structural  unemployment  has  been relatively
high.  After  1975,  an increase  in the  average  structural  unemployment  is
observed  but  experiencing  lower  fluctuations  afterwards. Cyclical
unemployment  was historically  low,  and  at times  negative,  indicating  excess  of
vacancies  probably  produced  by skill  mismatch. The relative  importance  of
cyclical  unemployment  increased  in  the  1980s.
The  econometric  results  for  the system  of four  equations  indicate
satisfactory  overall  fits  and  right  sign  of the  key  coefficients.  This
suggests  that  a segmented  labor  market  is an appropriate  set  up in  analyzing
the  statistical  information  concerning  wages,  unemployment  and  macro  pulicies.
In the  case  of the skilled  wages  equation,  most parameters  are
significant  using  a 90 percent  confidence  interval. The  effect  of the
distortionary  factor  0 appears  prominent--thus  suggesting  the  potential  impact
of exogenous  intervention  in raising  effective  market  wages.  The  effect  of
changes  in  the  price  of tradable  and  non-tradable  goods (PT  and PN)  indicates
the  positive  response  of formal  sector  nominal  wages  to inflation. This
contrast  with the  negligible  effect  observed  in the  case  of informal  sector32
Table  S
Chile.  Open  Unemployment  Equation
(Dependent  Variable:  Total  Unemployment)
9  MW/Wu  LF?  Y*  TOTS  LFS
870.3  4.57  5.55  0.82  -0.16  0.58  0.09
(1.40)  (0.92)  (1.98)  (2.17  (-0.85) (1.68) (1.99)
R2  -0.94  F-  27.7  DV  2.23
(Method  - 2SLS. Instruments:  government  expenditures,  working  age  pop.
domestic  credit  and  lagged  values;  Endogenous  variables:MW/Wu  and  Y*).
9 was  proxied  by  the  monetary  value  of  non-wage  labor  costs. LFT  is  the
fitted  value  of  a labor  force  series  regressed  against  time;  LFS  is  the
,shock  defined  as  the  difference  between  the  observed  labor  force  and
LFT. Y*  is  the  output  shock,  which  was  obtained  similarly  to  LFS. TOT
is  the  structural  trend  in  terms  of  trade,  which  is  a  fitted  value
against  a  time  trend.
Figure  1
Chile:  Components  of  the  Total  Unemployment
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wages.  This  is particularly  important  with regard  to PT,  which reflects  the
direct  effect  of nominal  devaluations. This  finding  suggests  the  extent  of
relative  wage rigidity  in the  formal  sector,  which is  at the  root  of an
unequitable  impact  of exchange  rate  policies  in presence  of segmentation.
This  observed  asymmetric  effect  cannot  be easily  explained  in the  context  of
an integrated  labor  market  and  suggests  the  need  for appropriate  corrective
policies.
Income  growth  exerts  a positive  effect  on growth  of formal  sector  wages,
as  well as the  pric  of non-tradables,  possibly  due to the  ability  of unions
to transform  in  wage gains  most of the increases  in  market  output  prices. l'he
growth  in capital  stock  affect  we negativ.ly,  a possible  explanation  being
that there  prevails  substitution  of skilled  workers  for  new capital. However,
the  parameter  in this  case is  not statistically  significant. Finally,  the
effect  of public  sector  employment  on ws is  negative,  which  would indicate
that the  share  of the  public  sector  in the  wage index  is  high,  and that
expansion  in  public  sector  employment  takes  places  only  at the  cost  of lower
wages in terms  of the  minimum  wage.
The  wu equation  indicates  that  growth  of prices  and  formal  sector  wages
are  not relevant  to  explain  change  in equilibrium  wages in  the informal
market. The  factor  relatively  more important  is income  growth,  which displays
a highly  significant  elasticit.  In comparing  the  coefficients  obtained  in
both the  we and  wu equations  with respect  to aggregate  income,  we conclude34
Table  9
A Seupented  Labor  Market  in the  Adjustment
(3SLS  Estimates;  1960-1985)
we  . 6.70  +0.99 (9)  +0.50  Yg +0.53  1Tg  +0.38  PUg  -2.78  Kg  -1.06  LS
(1.66)  (5.25)  (1.34)  (2.41)  (1.41)  (-1.15) (-3.72)
R2  - 0.79  DW - 2.13
F  - 11.2
wu -- 11.4 +0.15 (9)  +2.00  Y8 -0.94  PTg  -0.004P16  +3.74  Kg  -0.02  Lg -0.50vw
(-1.42)  (0.54)  (3.23)  (-0.59)  (-0.01)  (1.56)  (-0.07) (-1.10)
R2 - 0.73  DW - 1.79
F  - 8.74
OC -7.32  -1.75  Yg -0.92  PTg +0.52  PNg -0.79  Kg -0.51  LS +0.38  LCg  +0.67  wu
(1.39)(-3.38)  (2.40)  (1.81)  (-1.52) (-1.68) (3.04)  (1.99)
R2 a  0.42  DW - 1.99
F - 2.55
Ig  -10.4  +0.27  PTIPM  -0.02  we-1  +0.22  vu-i +0.30 1lg  -0.34  MID -0.11  YS-1
(-1.34)(1.32)  (-0.04)  (0.06)  (3.53)  (-3.68)  (-2.59)
-. 0.52  DW  *  1.82
F  - 5.12
All  variables  are  defined  in growtL  rates  (relative  to  minimum  wages)
ws - wage of skilled  workers  Yg-  Aggregate  Expenditures
wu - wages  of unskilled  workers  Kg-  Capital  Stock
(0)-  non-wage  costs  of labor  Lg-  Public  Sector  Employment
PTg-  Price  deflator  of tradable  goods  Mlg-  Ml
PNg-  Price  deflator  of non-tradable  goods  MlD- Dummy (1-1960-73)
LCg- Total  labor  costs (ws  +(0))  Ig-Investment
ws-l-  Lagged  (1  year)  ws  UC-Cyclical  Unemr'oyment
wu-l-  Lagged  (1  year)  wu  YS-1-Lagged  Income  shock
Instruments:  Public  Expenditures,  working  age  population,  lagged  values.
that  contractionary  policies  would  affect  unskilled  labor  in the informal
sector  relatively  more than  labor  in formal  activities. These  results  are in
line  with those  found  by Lopez  & Riveros  (1989)  in  a comparative  study
covering  four  countries. 30
30  In both  wage equations  we included  the rate  of growth  of the labor
force,  but results  were not significant.  We tested  for structural  differences
in the equations  for the periods  1960-73  and 1976-1981,  but we did not find35
In the  case  of the  cyclical  unemployment  equation,  results  indicate  that
ezpenditure  growth  as  well as the  expansion  in public  sector  employment  and
the  growth  in the  capital  stock  negatively  affect  unemployment. A positive
impact  deriver  from  both  tradable  prices  and  wages;  moreover,  when the
regression  was  performed  with the  ratio  PT/PN (i.e.,  the  real  exchange  rate),
the  parameter  was significant  and  positive,  indicating  that  switching  policies
create  more  cyclical  unemployment  likely  due  to both rigidities  in  moving
labor  across  sectors  and  higher  wage rigidity  in  the formal  sector.
The investment  equation  reveals  a  very significant  impact  of the  growth
in  Ml, a variable  we included  as a proxy  for  the  real interest  rate. 31
Furthermore,  a dummy  variable  on this  coefficient  (MlD-  1 for  the  period
1960-73)  resulted  significant  and  negative,  thus  implying  that  during  that
pert.d  the role  of the  interest  rate  on aggregate  investment  was probably  very
low  or zero.  The  other  variable  that  affect  investment  in an important  way  is
the  lagged  income  shocks  --  defined  as the  residual  obtained  by the  difference
between  observed  aggregate  income  and  a fitted  time  trend. The relative  price
of tradables  to  non-tradables  is  positive  and significant  at 90 percent.
However  wages do  not appear  to affect  investment  growth,  as well as output
prices  when included  separately.
A devaluation  increases  the  formal/informal  wage gap in  Chile. A
similar  result  is  associated  with an output  decline. An implication  is that
due to the  prevailing  labor  market  structure,  typical  adjustment  policies
exert  a  negative  equity  impact. This  evidence  also indicates  that  adjustment
evidence  in support  of the  idea  of a different  distribution  of the  data.
31. Due  to  control  of  the  interest  rate  during  most  of the  19609  and  early
1970s,  this  variable  is  not  reliable  to  measure  the  opportunity  cost  of  capital.
We also  use  the  investment  deflator,  but  the  result  did  not  came  out  significant.36
policies  increase  cyclical  unemployment.  Likewise,  contractive  policies
negatively  affect  investment  and  a real  devaluation  seems  to encourage  it,  but
labor  market  variables  do not directly  play a role.  However,  if labor  market
segmentation  makes  a nominal  devaluation  more ineffective  in reaching  a  real
devaluation  --  in the  case  of prices  of  non-tradables  highly  responsive  to the
increase  in formal  sector  wages 3 2 --  the  labor  market  would  play  an important
role.  In sum,  the  presence  of labor  market  segmentation  would  help to  make
unemployment  more persistent  and the  adjustment  more unequitable.
5.  Su  ry  and  Conclusions
In this  paper  we have  analyzed  the  key role  of the  labor  market  in the
adjustment  of the  Chilean  economy  in the  1980s. In order  to explain  the
performance  of the labor  market  during  the  structural  adiustment  of the  1980s
consideration  of the  deteriorated  situation  in terms  of unemployment  and  wages
in the late  1970s  was deemed  necessary. The  impact  on labor  market  variables
of a series  of structural  reforms  aimed  at reducing  the  economic  size  of the
State,  deregulating  product  and factor  markets  and  opening  the  economy  to
foreign  trade  were of paramount  importance  in the  1970s. Moreover,  the
absence  of labor  laws  and  the  use  of the  exchange  rate  as an stabilization
device,  gave signals  prompting  lower  employment  growth,  higher  growth  of non-
tradables,  decreasing  savings  and increasing  external  indebtedness.
After  1984 the  Chilean  economy  underwent  a major  macro  adjustment,  whose
success  was partly  expedited  by the  deep  reforms  carried  out  in the  1970s.
The  post-crisis  policy  was  characterized  by the  achievement  of significant
32,  Lopez  &  Riveros  (1989)  have  measured  this  effect,  and  calculated  the
elasticity  displayed  by  PN  with respect  to  prevailing  labor  market  distortions.37
real  devaluations,  further  privatization,  targeting  of social  expenditures  to
the  poor,  export  promotion  and financial  policies  to deal  with the  external
debt  and  to increase  investment. The  results  in terms  of the labor  market
were a dramatic  decline  in  open  unemployment  a  slight  increase  in real  wages
and  significant  growth  of employment  in  tradables.
A review  of the stylized  facts  of the  Chilean  labor  market  provides
support  to a  model  of labor  market  segmentation  in  which  crucial  variables  are
associated  vith the  degree  of protection  awarded  to formal  sector  workers.
Econometric  analysis  indicated  that  expenditure-switching  and expenditure-
reduction  policies  reduce  real informal  sector  wages  relative  to formal  sector
wages,  thus  negatively  affecting  income  distribution  in periods  of adjustment.
Relative  wage rigidity  in formal  sector  and  the  increase  in the  formal-
informal  wage gap  hinder  labor  mobility  and  affect  the  effectiveness  of
nominal  devaluations. In turn,  the  increase  in the  formal-informal  wage gap
yield  an increase  in  unemployment.  The  persistence  of open  unemployment  may
thus  be associated  to the  prevailing  labor  market  structure,  which is also  at
the  root  of a slower  adjustment  to  macro  policies.
There  are three  important  implicati$ns  that  can  be extracted  from  this
case  study. First,  macroeconomic  adjustment  should  be accompanied  by
deregulation  of the  labor  market  to  minimize  the  adverse  and  unequitable
effects  stemming  from  expenditure-reduction  and  expenditure-switching
policies. This  essentially  implies  that  wage indexation  and  other  policies
aimed  at  protecting  formal  sector  incomes  should  be carefully  examined.
Second,  the role  of skille  is important  in  connecting  structure  of the  labor
market  and  its response  to  macroeconomic  policies,  thus revealing  *he
importance  of including  skill  enhancement  within  structural  adjustment38
policies. This implies  that  the  increase  in labor  mobility  may  be achieved
not only  through  legal  and  institutional  reforms,  but  also  through  provision
of skills  to  informal  sector  workers. Third,  that  high open  unemployment  is
strongly  linked  to queueing  for  formal  sector  jobs,  which  is in turn  derived
from  distorted  wages.  In  periods  of transition,  total  unemployment  will be
not  only linked  to observed  productive  shifts  in  production,  but  also  to a
higher  queueing  unemployment  due  to relatively  greater  wage distortions. This
suggests  that  policies  aimed  at dealing  with  unemployment  must lend  attention
to the regulatory  framework  existing  in formal  labor  markets.39
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